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INTRODUCTION

Political parties have unique associational rights.' In party primaries,
party members associate to further their common political beliefs, and more
importantly, to nominate candidates. These candidate are the "standard
bearer[s]" for the political party-the people who "best represent[ ] the
party's ideologies and preferences. 2 The primary represents a "crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into
concerted action, and hence to political power in the community."3 Because
the primary is such a critical moment for the political party, the party's asso4
ciational rights are most important at this time.
In 2004, the Green Party of Alaska and the Republican Moderate Party
of Alaska filed suit in Alaska state court, arguing that a primary statute that
banned parties from joining together to voluntarily issue a single blanket
primary ballot violated their associational rights. In State v. Green Party of
Alaska, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Alaska Constitution protected the right of political parties to participate in voluntary blanket
primaries and that the statute impermissibly burdened the parties' associational rights.5 The court's analysis drew substantially from federal
constitutional precedent, and in particular, the Supreme Court's decision in
CaliforniaDemocratic Party
v. Jones, which recognized broad associational
S6
rights for political parties. Only a few months prior to the Alaska court's
decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Clingman v. Beaver,7 which had interpreted political parties' associational rights more
narrowly than had California DemocraticParty. Because Clingman stood in
tension with California Democratic Party, the Alaska court chose to leave
open the issue of whether a prohibition on a voluntary blanket primary ballot would violate the federal constitution. This Note addresses that question.
1.
See Nathaniel Persily, Toward A Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 750, 754 (2001).
2.
Eu v. S.E County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989) (quoting Ripon
Soc'y, Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 E2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); see also Cal. Democratic

Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
3.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986); see also Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997) ("[T]he New Party, and not someone else,
has the right to select the New Party's 'standard bearer.'"); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975)
(holding that the party, not the state, has the right to decide who will be state's delegates at the party

convention).
4.

See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 575 ("In no area is the political association's

right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee. That process often
determines the party's positions on the most significant public policy issues of the day, and even
when those positions are predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party's ambassador to
the general electorate in winning it over to the party's views."). These protections, however, only
extend to classes of voters, and the political party may not choose to exclude voters registered to the
party. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
5.

State v. Green Party of Alaska, 118 P.3d 1054 (Alaska 2005).

6.

Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).

7.

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005).

8.

Green PartyofAlaska, 118 P.3d at 1064 n.72.

December 2006]

Voluntary Blanket Primaries

In a blanket primary, the voter receives only one ballot, listing all of the
candidates from all of the parties. The voter can vote for one candidate for
each position, regardless of the candidate's or the voter's party affiliation.
For instance, a voter can nominate a Republican for state legislature, a Democrat for governor, and a Libertarian for the United States House of
Representatives.
There are three types of blanket primaries: 1) partisan, which are unconstitutional; 2) non-partisan; and 3) voluntary. In a partisan blanket primary,
the state requires the parties to participate, and the top vote-getters from
each party win that party's nomination.' In 2000, the Supreme Court held
this type of primary unconstitutional in CaliforniaDemocratic Party, invalidating primary schemes in California, Alaska, and Washington.' ° In a nonpartisan blanket primary, the top two vote-getters, regardless of party affiliation, move on to the general election. These candidates are not technically
any party's nominees, since both candidates can be from the same party."
Louisiana currently has a non-partisan blanket primary, which remains unchallenged in that state.' 2 Finally, a voluntary blanket primary, by definition,
is instituted by the parties rather than the state. In a voluntary blanket primary, the parties jointly agree to issue a blanket primary ballot and consent
to the top vote-getter winning their individual nominations.
Clingman and California Democratic Party are reconcilable in a way

that favors voluntary blanket primaries. When one reads Clingman and California Democratic Party in the way this Note suggests, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments compel the state to allow parties to issue voluntary
blanket primary ballots. This Note argues that, essentially, a voluntary blanket primary is the unconstitutional partisan blanket primary without the
unconstitutional element-state-mandated party participation. Part I considers the manner in which a state may compel association between a political
party and a voter. Part II argues that while the state has broad regulatory
power in the primary context, it may not prevent a political party from
choosing to associate with voters who wish to associate with it unless doing
so protects some other associational right, such as that of a second political
party. Finally, Part III argues that if two parties support a voluntary blanket
primary for their registered voters, then the state has no compelling interest
in protecting these parties from themselves. State interference in this context
9.

Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).

10. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing California's partisan blanket primary as analogous to the primary system in both Washington and
Alaska), rev'd, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
11.
For instance, in the recent New Orleans Mayoral Primary, both run-off candidates were
affiliated with the Democratic Party. See Nagin, Landrieu headfor New Orleans runoff, CNN.coM,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/23/nola.elections/index.html (last visited July 2, 2006).
12. See Cal. DemocraticParty, 530 U.S at 598 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
Louisiana's non-partisan blanket primary is excepted from the Court's holding that partisan blanket
primaries are unconstitutional). But see Wash. State Republican Party v. Washington, No. 05-35774,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21421 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (holding a top-two scheme adopted by the
Washington voters in a referendum unconstitutional).
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would severely burden a core associational right of voters and political parties and would not satisfy strict scrutiny. Therefore, when parties wish to
issue a voluntary blanket primary ballot, the federal constitution compels
states to allow them to do so.
I.

STATE COMPELLED ASSOCIATIONS: BURDENS ON POLITICAL

PARTIES IN PRIMARIES

State regulation of elections often implicates the rights guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but in ways that rarely cause a court
to hold a regulation unconstitutional. "Election laws will invariably impose
some burden upon individual voters," 3 and a burden on the associational
rights of parties or voters does not necessarily compel strict scrutiny. Instead, "a more flexible standard applies"14:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. 5
For instance, a state may force certain associations upon a political party
by imposing a primary, even though mandating these associations burdens
the party's associational rights.
This Part considers the various types of primaries that states have historically imposed, and how these primaries implicate the associational
interests of political parties. Section L.A discusses states' imposition of primaries on political parties, despite the resulting interference with those
parties' associational rights. Section I.B considers the party's core associational right to identify and associate only with the class of voters of its
choosing in the selection of its candidates. Certain state-mandated primaries, such as the partisan blanket primary, impose too great a burden on this
right.
A. ForcedAssociations:Imposing a Primary
A primary is an association between the political party and the voter.
Most primaries are mandated by the state, and such a mandated association

13.

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433 (1992).

14.
Id. at 434; see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)
("Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a
compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's 'important regulatory interests' will usually be enough to justify 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions."' (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434)).
15.

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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burdens the party's associational rights. 6 These primary systems strip party

activists of their power to define the party's candidates. These activists may
favor a system that allows them either to choose who will be the party's
nominees or to decide what is necessary for someone to qualify as a member of their party. Instead, voters, who may not have invested time and
energy in the party, choose the candidates, and the state decides what qualifies a voter to become a member of the party." At the turn of the nineteenth
century, when states began adopting primaries and other political procedures

for parties to nominate candidates, parties challenged the regulations as in-

fringing on their associational rights.' 8 State courts repeatedly upheld laws

that regulated political parties, often refusing to consider parties as voluntary associations. 9 Today, it remains "too plain for argument" that states
may require political parties to participate in primaries.' °
A state has great flexibility in mandating associations between the party
and the voters-even in defining the association's limits. Although political
parties have the right to choose their own candidates,2' states control a
party's ability to exclude or include voters during the party's exercise of that
right.2
States currently mandate a variety of primaries: closed,23
16. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) ("Forcing a group to accept
certain members may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views,
that it intends to express. Thus, freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations
removed)).
17. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and PartisanCompetition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 283-84 (2001).
18. Adam Winkler, Voters' Rights and Parties' Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation in
the State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877-80 (2000).
19.

Id. at 878-80.

20. Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Am. Party of Tex. v. White,
415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974)). While the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue, the
Ninth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of mandated primary elections, and the First Circuit
has strongly suggested it would agree. See id. at 872-73; Cool Moose Party v. Rhode Island, 183
F.3d 80, 83 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000);
Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 781; Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 286.
21.

See supra note 3.

22. See Winkler, supra note 18, at 888-89 ("The regulation of the membership of the party
and of the right to participate in the nomination of its candidates, in this respect, is taken from the
party and placed in the control of the Legislature." (quoting State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel, 105 N.W.
174, 179 (Neb. 1905)) (alteration removed)); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN &
RICHARD H. PILDES. THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 377
(2d ed. 2001).
23. In a closed primary, only voters registered with the political party may participate in its
primary. The state determines whether there will be a "waiting period" before a voter newly registered with a political primary may vote in its primary. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301, 253304 (2005) (imposing fourteen day "waiting period" before a voter registered to a new party may
vote in the primary); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2005). The Court has never ruled on these primaries directly, but lower courts have found them constitutional. See, e.g., Van Allen v. Berman, No.
98-9337, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15071 (2d Cir. July 2, 1999); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F Supp. 837
(D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976); Smith v. Penta 405 A.2d 350, 357 (N.J. 1979) (upholding the constitutionality of the closed primary system); In re Barkman, 726 A.2d 440 (Pa. Commw.
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2526

semi-closed, open," and nonpartisan blanket. In these ways, the state can

compel the party to affiliate with all voters registered with the party in a
closed primary, with registered voters and independents in a semi-closed
primary, with all voters who select the party's ballot on the day of the
primary in an open primary, or with all voters in a non-partisan blanket
primary. All of these primary schemes burden the associational rights of the
party faithful to some extent because, at the very least, the party may not
exclude voters registered with it even though such voters may not be loyal to
the party. Moreover, state legislatures, not parties, govern party membership
through registration laws." Even the waiting period-the amount of time a
voter must wait after registering with a party before he or she is eligible to
vote in its primary-is within the province of the legislature. Some states
use a closed primary with a same-day waiting period, where the voter may
register with a party and vote in its primary on the day of the primary. 2 At

Ct. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the closed primary system (citing Nader, 417 F. Supp.
837 (D. Conn. 1976))).
24. In a semi-closed primary system, the party may designate whether it will allow independent voters to vote in its primary. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-431 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit.
26, § 1-104 (2005). The Constitution mandates these primaries in certain circumstances. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
25. In an open primary, the voter is given every party's ballot and selects one in the voting
booth. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 5.62 (2003-2004). In a semi-open primary, any voter can vote in any
party's primary but is restricted to that single party's ballot before he or she goes to the voting booth.
See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.397 (2004). For the purposes of this Note, I have not differentiated
and will refer to both generally as "open primaries." Whether open primaries are constitutional is an
unsettled question. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 577 n.8 (declining to reach the
question of whether an open primary is constitutional); Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex.
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1981) (same); see also Miller v. Brown, No. 05-2254, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 22234 (4th Cir. Aug. 30, 2006) (reversing the district court's decision that Virginia's Eleventh Senatorial District Republican Committee lacked standing to challenge the open
primary and was not ripe for review, and remanding to the district court for a decision on the merits).
26. This type of primary was distinguished from a partisan blanket primary in Califomia
Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 598 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a non-partisan blanket primary,
the voter receives one ballot with all candidates from each political party and can only vote for one
candidate per office, but may select a candidate from one political party for Governor and another
for State Senator, for example. The top two vote-getters move on to the general election. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:401, 18:481 (2005). In Louisiana's system, if one candidate receives an
outright majority, that candidate is declared the winner and does not run in the general election. Id. §
18:511. That difference may prevent the primary scheme from being invalidated because the Ninth
Circuit has recently held that the top two vote-getters may be considered the party's nominee where
the candidate can self-identify as running for a particular party's nomination regardless of the
party's willingness to be associated with that particular candidate. See Wash. State Republican Party
v. Washington, No. 05-35774, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21421 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (holding a
top-two scheme adopted by the Washington voters in a referendum unconstitutional).
27.

See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-312 (2005).

28. See, e.g., Nader,417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976) (upholding a closed primary from a
challenge by independent voters and noting that those voters could simply register with the party on
the day of the primary and unregister the following day).
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the opposite extreme, states can impose an eleven-month waiting period.
The party has no say in the waiting period's length.3 °

9

A party must associate with, at the very least, its registered voters, and
the party has no say in who its registered voters are.3 The act of registration
rests entirely with the individual voter and is part of the voter's basic free-

dom to associate. 32 Even a voter with adverse principles may register with a
party. As the Court articulated in California Democratic Party, a voter
should "simply join the party" if she feels disenfranchised because one
party's primary is essentially the only competitive election in her district.33
Such an act would not meaningfully reflect the voter's political preferences,
since the voter may not truly believe in that party's values, but the Court still

considered it the appropriate action for such a voter to take.
B. When ForcedAssociations Over-Burden the Party: PartyRaiding

Parties have an interest in limiting the amount of raiding that occurs in
their primary, and no state can impose a primary that exposes the party to
too much raiding without that party's agreement. Party raiding is "a process
in which dedicated members of one party formally switch to another party
to alter the outcome of that [second] party's primary.'3 4 Parties have the right

29.

Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1973).

30. See Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 284 (noting the mismatch between a supposed constitutional right "not to associate" and a rule that allows the state to determine the timing for
membership).
31. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 601 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The act
of casting a ballot in a given primary may . .. constitute a form of association that is at least as
important as the act of registering."); Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 577 n.8 ("[T]he act of
voting in [a] primary fairly can be described as an act of affiliation with the [party]." (quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex. reL La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 130 n.2 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting))); id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the real world, however, anyone can 'join' a
political party merely by asking for the appropriate ballot at the appropriate time or (at most)
by registering within a state-defined reasonable period of time before an election...."); State ex rel.
La Follette v. Democratic Party of U.S., 287 N.W.2d 519, 535 (Wis. 1980) ("[T]he essence of the
legal definitions of party membership in the United States will surely continue to be selfdesignation. The fact remains that today even in ...[a] closed-primary state you are a Democrat if
you say you are; no one can effectively say you are not; and you can become a Republican any time
the spirit moves you simply by saying that you have become one. You accept no obligations by such
a declaration; you receive only a privilege-the privilege of taking an equal part in the making of
the party's most important decision, the nomination of its candidates for public office." (quoting
AUSTIN RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 166 (1975))).

32. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1973) ('The right to associate with the
political party of one's choice is an integral part of th[e] basic constitutional freedom [to associate].").
33.

Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 584.

34. Id. at 572. Voters may "raid" a primary in two different ways. First, voters may vote for a
weaker candidate so that the candidate from their party has a greater chance of success. For an example of this type of raiding see infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Second, voters may vote
for a candidate who is perceived as more mainstream---even when another candidate who adheres
closer to the party's core ideology may be just as electable. For an example of this type of raiding,
consider when Democrats crossed over to nominate John McCain in the 2000 Michigan presidential
preference primary. See Editorial, Mr McCain'sMichigan Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2000, at A20
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to "limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and
persuasions that underlie the association's being,"35 and therefore can successfully challenge primary schemes that over-expose them to party raiding.
When parties oppose a partisan blanket primary, it is unconstitutional for
the state to impose it because it allows for significant party raiding. In California Democratic Party, the California Democratic Party, the California
Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and
Freedom Party sued California, arguing that the statute imposing a partisan
blanket primary unconstitutionally burdened their associational rights.36 The

Supreme Court agreed, holding that any primary system must allow the
party to select a standard bearer to represent their party.37 The Court held the
primary system severely burdened the political parties' associational rights
because it "force[d] political parties to associate with-to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by-those who, at best, have
refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated
with a rival." This severe burden triggered strict scrutiny, and the Court
found no compelling interest to justify the primary regime. 39
Many parties oppose partisan blanket primaries because they fear party
raiding. For instance, Alaska had a partisan blanket primary for much of the
twentieth century. In 1974, during debates to re-institute the blanket primary, many Alaskan Democrats feared that Republicans would "use[] it to
their advantage by crossing party lines in the primary to elect the weakest
Democratic candidate." ° This apprehension of party raiding was realized in
1980, when Democratic challenger Clark Gruening defeated two-term Democratic Senator Mike Gravel in the primary.4' Republican voters at least
partially contributed to this defeat, since they wished to see a Republican
take the seat but considered Gravel a difficult candidate to beat.42 Gruening
lost to Republican Frank Murkowski in the general election, and Murkowski
served in the Senate until 2002. 43 Ten years later, because of concerns about
(noting that the Michigan results showed McCain won because of independent and Democratic
voters).
35.
Cal. DemocraticParry, 530 U.S. at 574 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122). The Court
went on to explain this meant the party could prevent non-party members from voting in its primary
in this context. The potential for a non-loyal voter to register with the party, discussed in Section
IA, remains the same.
36.

Cal. DemocraticParty, 530 U.S. at 571.

37.

Id. at 575 (citing Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)).

38. Id. at 577; see also id. at 578 ("[T]he prospect of having a party's nominee determined
by adherents of an opposing party is far from remote-indeed, it is a clear and present danger.").
39.

Id. at 584.

40. O'Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Memorandum from
Gordon S. Harrison, Director, Legislative Research Agency, Research Request 90.294 (May 23,
1990)).
41.

See Helen Dewar, Maverick Gravel is Defeated, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1980, at Al.

42.

See id. (noting Gravel and others blamed Republican cross-over voters for his defeat).

43. Helen Dewar, GOP,With 53 Seats, Claims the Senate, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1980, at Al.
In 2002, Senator Murkowski was elected Governor of Alaska and retired from the Senate. See Biog-
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party raiding and a potential decline in party discipline, the Alaska Republican Party amended its internal rules to prohibit voters registered with other
political parties from voting in its primary."
II.

COMPELLED ASSOCIATIONS OF VOTERS AND POLITICAL PARTIES:
BROADENING THE PRIMARY

Although the state cannot force the party to associate with voters who do

not affiliate with the party, the party can choose to broaden its associations
to include voters who are not formally associated with the party. This Part
examines the rights and interests of voters and political parties to broaden

their associations. Section H.A argues that when voters challenge a regulation, a state can defend its regulation as protecting political parties only
when the political party agrees with the regulation. Section II.B discusses

the state interest in protecting political parties. 5 It contends that when other
political parties' associational rights are also implicated by the regulation,
the state can choose to implement a primary to protect either political party.

On the other hand, the state cannot assert a state interest in protecting the
political party from itself because that would unconstitutionally substitute

the state's judgment for that of the party. Finally, Section II.C explores the
rights of voters to associate with more than one political party at once, forming dual associations.
A. The State Interest in ProtectingPoliticalParties'Associational
Rights from Voters
When a voter refuses to register with a political party and the party does

not want that voter to participate in its primary, the state has an interest in protecting the associational rights of political parties and the electoral process to

raphy of Governor Murkowski, http://gov.state.ak.us/bio.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). He lost the
2006 gubernatorial primary, and will not stand for re-election. William Yardley, Governor Finishes
Third in Alaska G.O.P Primary,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, at A19.
44. At least, that is what the party argued when it challenged the blanket primary as unconstitutionally burdening its associational rights. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 7-9, Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Callaghan, 520 U.S. 1209 (1997) (No. 95-1962),
1996 WL 33438499. The Alaska Supreme Court held the blanket primary constitutional in 1995. See
O'Callaghan,914 P.2d at 1263. Originally, a U.S. District Court Judge had found the practice unconstitutional, as a preliminary ruling, and following this preliminary decision the parties had
stipulated that the lieutenant governor would adopt new rules allowing for separate primary ballots.
Id. at 1252-53. The 1992 and 1994 Republican primaries were semi-closed, with only registered
Republicans and unaffiliated voters allowed to vote in the primary. Id. at 1253. After a voter challenged this closed Republican primary, the Alaska Supreme Court eventually found the partisan
blanket primary constitutional in 1996, and ordered the Republican Party to join the blanket ballot.
Id. at 1264. Five years later, the Alaska Republicans' argument won a majority of the Supreme Court
in another case challenging a partisan blanket primary, and the Court invalidated partisan blanket
primaries. See Cal. DemocraticParty, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
45. In the interest of brevity, this Note will discuss when a state can or cannot assert an interest in protecting political parties occasionally without qualifying that a voter or a party must have
challenged the state regulation for the state to assert such interests.

612

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:603

defend a closed primary regime. 6 In Nader v. Schaffer, independent voters
in Connecticut who wished to vote in the Republican Party's primary sued
the state to open the primary.' The party opposed allowing nonmembers to
vote in its primary. 8 While the statute burdened voters' rights by conditioning the right to vote in a primary on the act of publicly affiliating with the
party, the court reasoned that voters who refused to affiliate with the party
"are not 'interested' in nominating the candidate who presents the best
chance of winning the general election while remaining most faithful to
party policies and philosophies., 49 This language suggests that the court was
concerned with the potential for the independent voters to raid the primary--either by voting for candidates who were not true to the party's
ideals or by voting for a candidate who did not have the best chance of winning. The court went on to argue that requiring voters to register with a party
served important "housekeeping function[s]," suggesting that both party
leadership and candidates benefited from knowing who the members of the
party were. 0 Because the voters were not willing to join the party, their interest was "fundamentally inconsistent" with the party's interest,"l and the
statute was nothing more than a "minimal infringement" on the associational interests of the voters, prompting the court to apply rational basis. 52
The court noted that the Connecticut legislature had broad authority to adopt
whatever type of primary it considered "best meet[s] the needs of the
[s]tate ' 53 and that the state had legitimate interests in preserving the parties
as viable interest groups and in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. These state interests
justified the closed primary under the lower
54
standard of review.
Had the Republican Party of Connecticut wanted to include independent
voters, however, the result would have been different, and in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut that very situation arose. The Republican

Party of Connecticut decided it wanted to allow independent voters to vote
in its primary, and it sued the state, arguing that the regulation preventing
this association unconstitutionally burdened its associational rights.55 The
U.S. Supreme Court characterized "[t]he Party's attempt to broaden the base
of public participation in and support for its activities [as] conduct undenia46.

Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 847 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).

47.

Id. at 840.

48. See id.; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 212 (1986) ("In
[Nader], the Party opposed the plaintiff's efforts to participate in the Party primary.").
49.

Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 848.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52. Id. at 845. ("[T]he state has a legitimate interest in protecting party members' associational rights, by legislating to protect the party 'from intrusion by those with adverse political
principles.'" (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952))).
53.

Id. at 850.

54.

See id. at 845.

55.

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 209 (1986).
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bly central to the exercise of the right of association."56 The Court held the
state regulation placed the same burden on the voters that the Nader court

had found minimal, but that the situation here presented another burden, one
on the political party's associational rights. 7 Together, these two burdens
compelled strict scrutiny." In Tashjian, the state's regulation impermissibly

burdened the independent voters and the party because no conflict existed
between the associational rights of the voters and the party; the burden was
imposed upon both groups and in protection of no one. 9 The Court noted
the interests of the independent voter were no longer "fundamentally incon-

sistent" with those of the party members because the party members had
made an internal decision to allow those voters into the primary.60 The state

had no interest in protecting the associational rights of other political parties
because the voters were independent and therefore the regulation implicated
no other political party's associational rights. Many courts have since char-

acterized the "associational right[s] of a political party [as including the
right] to decide whether it wants to include nonmembers in its own primaries; this is a decision that the state generally must respect in its regulation
of primaries.'

To allow the state to assert an interest in protecting a political party from
itself would strip the party of its autonomy and associational rights. Because

the party willingly associated with the independent voters in Tashjian, the
state's interest in preventing raiding was "not implicated. 62 Instead, "[t]he
Party's determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the
structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, [was] protected by
the Constitution. 63 Internal party decisions, such as the Republican Party of
Connecticut's decision to permit independents to vote in the Republican
primary, are fundamental to a party's right to associate. The state has no
56. Id. at 214. The regulation prevented the political party's members from choosing "to
broaden opportunities for joining the association by their own act, without any intervening action by
potential voters." Id. at 216 n.7. The Court described the second interest in broadening public participation as less important. See id. at 215.
57. Id. at 216. The Court characterized the other burden in requiring voters to publicly affiliate with the party as more important. Id. at 216 n.7.
58.

See id. at 217.

59.

Id. at 216 n.6.

60. Compare id. with Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F Supp. 837, 848 (D.Conn. 1976), aff'd, 429
U.S. 989 (1976).
61.

McClure v. Galvin, 386 F.3d 36, 41 (st Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted).

62. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 219. The Court rejected the state interest and distinguished it from
other, seemingly similar state interests accepted in Nader and like cases because "[i]n the present
case, the state statute is defended on the ground that it protects the integrity of the Party against the
Party itself." Id. at 224; see also Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 124 (1981) ("It is for the National Party-and not the Wisconsin Legislature or any court-to
determine the appropriate standards for participation in the Party's candidate selection process.").
63.

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224.

64. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
648 (2000). Similarly, neither a state nor a court could decide that the Boy Scouts' exclusion of a
homosexual scout leader was irrational or antithetical to the Boy Scouts as an organization-this
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compelling interest in protecting the political party from itself, even if the
state wants to prevent the party from acting in an unwise or irrational manner. A political party's associational rights ensure that the party, not the
state, decides how the party's associational goals are best achieved. The
party's internal decisions affecting the associational rights of another party,

however, present a different situation.
B. The State Interest of ProtectingParties:Saving the Party
from Other PoliticalParties

This Section argues that the state has an interest in protecting political
parties when at least one
to the state's protection.
Beaver. In Clingman, the
political parties, such as

political party whose interests are affected agrees
Section II.B.1 considers the case of Clingman v.
state could protect the associational rights of other
the Republican Party, and this explains why the

Libertarian Party could not open its primary to Republican voters. Section
II.B.2 argues that when a state regulation protects at least one political party
that seeks such protection, courts should defer to the state legislature. Nevertheless, the state has no interest, as Section II.B.3 argues, in only

protecting a political party from itself, for that would unconstitutionally
substitute the state's judgment for that of the party.
1. Clingman v. Beaver and Reverse Party Raiding
In Clingman v. Beaver, the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma (LPO) sued

Oklahoma to allow it to have an open primary, one in which every voter-

not just Libertarians and independent voters---could vote.66 The Court had

considered this scenario as a hypothetical in Tashjian, noting that it would
raise different considerations than in Tashjian itself and that these considerations would implicate other parties' associational rights by threatening those

was a judgment call for the organization. See id. at 651 ("The [New Jersey Supreme Court] concluded that the exclusion of members like Dale appears antithetical to the organization's goals and
philosophy. But our cases reject this sort of inquiry; it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's
expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent." (citing La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124) (first citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224 ("The State argues that its statute is well designed to save the
Republican Party from undertaking a course of conduct destructive of its own interests. But on this
point 'even if the State were correct, a State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own
judgment for that of the Party.' The Party's determination of the boundaries of its own association,
and of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution. 'And as is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on
the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational.' " (quoting La Follette, 450
U.S. at 123-24)); see also Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 227-28
(1989) ("[E]ven if [a state regulation] saves a political party from pursuing self-destructive acts, that
would not justify a State substituting its judgment for that of the party."); La Follette, 450 U.S. at
123-24 ("[A] State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the
Party... [A]s is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere
on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational.").
66.

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
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parties with "disorganization effects. 67 In Clingman, the burden on the associational rights of the LPO paralleled the burden on the Republican Party
of Connecticut in Tashjian, but LPO's proposed open primary had the potential to allow reverse primary raiding in the other political parties' primaries.

The voters who wished to vote in the LPO's primary were already registered
with another party. 6' These other parties had an interest in ensuring their
registered voters were committed to associating with them so they would
not be threatened by the "disorganization effects" that the Tashjian Court
had considered a potential problem. 8
The Clingman Court fractured on the issue of how significantly the statute had burdened the voters and the LPO. The burden on the party-that it

may not "broaden [its] opportunities for joining.., by [its] own act, without
any intervening action by potential voters"-was the same burden the Court
7 °
Six Justices in Clingman
had assigned lesser importance to in Tashjian.
agreed that, standing alone, this burden was not severe enough to trigger
strict scrutiny, and the Court applied a lower standard of review. 71 The Court
stated it used rational basis," but it classified the state interests as "important ' 73 and the concurrence argued that the review should have been more
exacting."
A lower standard of review was appropriate because in Clingman the
state acted to protect the associational rights of the other political parties.
The burden on the other political parties would have been great if the state
had not prevented the LPO from opening its primary to Democratic and Republican voters, while the burden on the LPO was great because the state
had. The LPO's right to associate with registered Republicans and Democ-

rats was incompatible with the Republican and Democratic parties' right to
preserve the loyalty of their own registered voters. Had registered Republi-

cans or Democrats been allowed to vote in another party's primary, those
67. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 n.13 ("Under such circumstances, the effect of one party's
broadening of participation would threaten other parties with the disorganization effects... .").
68. Clingman explained the distinction that the voters were forced to affiliate publicly in
Tashjian whereas in Clingman the voters challenging the primary had already publicly affiliated
with another party. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 592. This Note argues the distinction had more to do with
the parties with which the voters had registered, not the public affiliation requirement.
69.

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 n. 13.

70.

Clingman, 544 U.S. at 592 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n.7) (ellipses in original).

71. Id. The justices also agreed that the burdens in Clingman were not as severe as in
immons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369 (1997). Clingman, 544 U.S. at 592. The
Court in immons, 520 U.S. at 369, had held that a ban on allowing candidates to be more than one
party's nominee was "justified by 'correspondingly weighty' valid state interests."
72. See Clingman, 544 U.S. at 587 ("We are persuaded that any burden Oklahoma's semiclosed primary imposes is minor and justified by legitimate state interests.").
73.

Id. at 593.

74. Id. at 598 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I think respondents' claim implicates important
associational interests, and I see no reason to minimize those interests to dispose of this case."); see
also M. Jason Scoggins, Recent Development, Placing Unnecessary Limits on Voting Associational
Freedoms: Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005), 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 345, 351
(2005) (arguing the scrutiny was not adequately searching).
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voters might have become more loyal to that other party. Without a mandate
to un-register with the Republican or Democratic Party, however, such voters might have remained registered Democrats or Republicans. These voters
would then have been well-positioned to raid the Democratic or Republican
primaries if they saw a chance to nominate either a more Libertarian-leaning
candidate or a candidate less likely to siphon-off support for the LPO. This
potential for reverse party raiding and the burden it would cause on the associational rights of the other political parties-the Democratic and
Republican parties in this case--caused the Court ultimately to uphold
Oklahoma's statute.
The concern about election and campaign-related disorder that motivated the Court in Clingman was the same concern that had led Justice
Marshall to hold out the Clingman scenario as raising different considera' 75
tions-including threatening other parties with "disorganization effects " when he authored Tashjian. Both concerns correspond with a fear of reverse
primary raiding. The Clingman plurality's view that voters would be willing
to vote in many primaries illustrates that it was concerned that these voters
had no real connection to the LPO, and that a voter's interest in associating
with other political parties would "cease[] to be of analytic use.

76

If these

voters could assert rights to vote in the primary of any political party, their
registration with a particular party would become less meaningful. If registration were so trivial, forcing political parties to select their candidates via
primaries would become a much greater burden.
The state can readily assert an interest in protecting parties when there is
a lower standard of review and when the state is protecting other political
parties. Clingman identified three important state interests: (1) "preserv[ing]
[political] parties as viable and identifiable interest groups"; 7" (2) aiding in
"parties' electioneering and party-building efforts";7" and (3) "guard[ing]
against party raiding and 'sore loser' candidacies. ' 79 The Court's discussion
of these state interests, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, demonstrates
that the Court was concerned with the fate of the Democrats and Republicans if the LPO was able to open its primary.'s In its discussion of the first
state interest, the Court reasoned that, without a scheme that required a voter
to disaffiliate, the parties could suffer from their voters having a less mean-

75.

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 n.13.

76.

Clingman, 544 U.S. at 591 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

77. Id. at 594 (quoting Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976)) (alteration
"[political]" in original).
78.

Id. (citing Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 848).

79. Id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)); see also id. at 595 ("[The] commitment [to the party] is lessened if party members may retain their registration in one party while
voting in another party's primary.").
80. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is clear, of course, that the majority here is concerned only with the Democratic and Republican Parties, since party building is precisely what the
LPO is attempting to accomplish.").
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ingful association with them."' In its treatment of the second interest, the
Court noted that under the proposed scheme, "parties risk expending precious resources to turn out party members who may have decided to cast
their votes elsewhere.8 2 The court was worried the party would waste its
resources on voters who were essentially only affiliated with the party to
engage in reverse raiding.
Although the Court did not explicitly identify a potential for reverse
party raiding, the Court's treatment of the state interests and the analysis of
how those interests affected other political parties suggest that the issue of
reverse party raiding motivated the Court. Because the LPO invited the voters registered to other parties to vote in its primary, the primary,.implicated
83
no concern about raiding the LPO's primary similar to in Tashjian. Reverse
party raiding might occur, however, if, as the Court explained, Democrats
raided the Libertarian primary by voting for the "candidate most likely to
siphon off votes from the Republican candidate in the general election." In
other words, voters might vote in the Libertarian primary precisely as the
Libertarian Party hoped-in a way that would improve the viability of its
candidates. Because this might hurt a second political party, Republicans,
Oklahoma was permitted to prevent it. On the other hand, had the Republicans and Democrats agreed to the LPO proposed rule, Clingman should
have come out differently.
2. Deference to Legislatures Where There Is Danger
of Reverse Party Raiding

It is appropriate for the legislature to decide what is best for the state in
situations where a regulation could burden different voters in different
ways. 5 The regulation of elections always imposes some burden on voters,
86
and legislatures have some discretion in how to implement election laws.
Thus, the Clingman majority concluded that "[s]tates may, and inevitably
must, enact reasonable regulations of parties,
elections, and ballots to reduce
' 7
election- and campaign-related disorder.

81.

Id. at 595 (majority opinion); see also Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties:

Correctingthe Supreme Court's Understandingof Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1302 (2005).
82.

Clingman, 544 U.S. at 596.

83.

See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 219 & n.9 (1986).

84.

Clingman, 544 U.S. at 596.

85. For a further discussion of Clingman's deference to legislatures, see Lowell J. Schiller,
Recent Development, Imposing Necessary Boundaries on Judicial Discretion in Ballot Access
Cases: Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331, 341 (2005)
("[A] fair reading of Clingman reveals a careful attempt to advance not only stability, but also the
competing values of free association, a robust franchise, and deference to legislatures.").
86.
(1968).

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34

87. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 593 (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351, 358 (1997)).
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In Clingman and other cases that presented a potential for reverse party
raiding, the Court used language that suggests the state may limit the voter
to one party's primary, regardless of whether the party assents to a voter's
affiliation with multiple parties. For instance, in American Party of Texas,
the plaintiffs, all minor political parties, sued the state arguing that their associational rights were burdened by a statute banning a voter who voted in a
major party's primary from signing a nominating petition for a minor party's
candidate. 9 If the minor parties were successful, a voter could freely vote in
a major party's primary and nominate candidates from another, minor party.
Without agreement from the major parties, permitting a voter to associate
with both a major and minor party in the same nomination process threatened the associational rights of the major parties. Perhaps because the major
parties did not intervene and indicate their assent to their voters' affiliating
with other parties, the Court upheld the statute in American Party of Texas,

stating it was "nothing more than a prohibition against any elector's casting
more than one vote in the process of nominating candidates for a particular
office. ' 90

The state legislature may choose between allowing a voter to both vote
in the primary and sign a nominating petition, or alternatively either to vote
in the primary or to sign a nominating petition. 9' In an earlier case, Jenness
v. Fortson, the Court upheld a Georgia statute that allowed voters to do
92
both. The state legislature clearly can choose to limit its voters to a single

nominating act,93 but this nominating act has been read traditionally to allow

states to limit it to one act for an individual office. 94 States do not have a
"duty to allow voters to move freely from one to the other method of nomi-

88. See, e.g., Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786 (1974) ("[Tlhe State may determine that it is essential to the integrity of the nominating process to confine voters to supporting one
party and its candidates in the course of the same nominating process.").
89.

Id. at 767-68.

90. Id. at 785. The Court went on to note that it was for the state to "determine that it is
essential to the integrity of the nominating process to confine voters to supporting one party and its
candidates in the course of the same nominating process." Id. at 786. This Note has argued this
language is appropriate only where there are conflicting associational rights of different parties. Had
the parties' interests all aligned, the state could not substitute its judgment for the parties. See infra
Section H.B.3.
91.
Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 785 n.17 ("It is true that under the Georgia system in Jenness v. Fortson, the State had apparently decided that its legitimate goals would not be compromised
by allowing voters to sign a petition even though they have signed others and participated in a party
primary. Nothing in that decision, however, can be read to impose upon the States the affirmative
duty to allow voters to move freely from one to the other method of nominating candidates for the
same public office." (citation omitted)).
92.

Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,438-39 (1971).

93.

See, e.g., Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 785; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 743 (1974).

94. See, e.g., Jackson v. Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 403 U.S. 925 (1971)
(upholding a requirement that if a voter was to sign a candidacy petition for an independent candidate the voter could not have voted for a candidate to that same office in the primary election);
Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 806 (1970)
(same); Moore v. Bd. of Elections, 319 F Supp. 437 (D.D.C. 1970) (same).
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nating candidates for the same public office."' Like in Clingman, the regulations at issue in Jenness v. Fortson and American Party of Texas burdened
associational rights regardless of the way the regulations were implemented-i.e., regardless of whether the regulations allowed or prohibited a
voter to sign a nominating petition and vote in a primary. Thus, the legislature could choose which regulation to implement. 96 For these reasons, the
Clingman Court appropriately deferred to the legislature. If the Republicans
and Democrats had agreed to allow their voters to vote in the LPO's primary, however, the regulation only would have protected the parties from
themselves, and the Court should have applied a higher standard of review.
3. No State Interest in Protectingthe Partyfrom Itself
This Note argues that some of Clingman's language erroneously suggests that Oklahoma could protect the Libertarian Party from itself.97
According to the Court, Oklahoma had a state interest in maintaining existing party ideologies.98 If carried through to its logical conclusion, the
Court's reasoning would effectively allow the state to prevent a party from
evolving. This flawed reasoning suggests that a party could not find new
ways to promote the candidates who would attract cross-over voters, as the
Republican Party of Connecticut did. This would impermissibly substitute
the state's judgment for that of the party. The language, however, was not
central to the holding, and this Note argues that it should be read narrowly.
As discussed in Section II.B.1, Clingman may have been about protecting
other political parties from the disorganization effects and election-related
disorder that could occur if the LPO were allowed to implement its rule.
Therefore, the Court did not need to find Oklahoma had an independent interest in protecting the LPO from its own rule in Clingman. Instead, as
Tashjian made clear, states must permit parties to find common ground with
voters by giving those voters a voice in their primaries and allow the party to
attract a broader class of people. Clingman only added a small caveat: states
may prevent parties from doing so in a way that threatens other political
parties.
If courts were to follow Clingman's dicta regarding preserving party labels, it would signal a significant break from precedent. The Court in Tashjian
refused to recognize that preserving party labels could be a compelling state
95.

Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 785 n.17.

96. As Part III will argue, however, where a regulation would burden the associational rights
of parties and voters if it is implemented in only one way, the Constitution compels the state not to
apply the regulation in the way that would burden the associational rights of both the political parties and the voters.
97. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 594 (2005) ("It does not matter that the LPO is
willing to risk the surrender of its identity in exchange for electoral success.").
98. Id. (suggesting that there was a state interest in preserving the "integrity of its primary
system" and in "avoid[ing] primary election outcomes which would tend to confuse or mislead the
general voting population to the extent [it] relies on party labels as representative of certain ideologies" (quoting Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976)) (second alteration in
original)).
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interest because the Court professed "a great[] faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues." 99 The Tashjian
Court argued that "[a] State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them
must be viewed with some skepticism."'te
The Court has not found an important or compelling state interest in a
state's desire to "avoid primary election outcomes which would tend to con-

fuse or mislead the general voting population to the extent [the voters] rel[y]
on party labels as representative of certain ideologies"' ' in other cases regulating primaries unless either: (1) a potential for raiding existed, or (2) the
party acquiesced to the regulation. As support for the existence of this interest Clingman cites two cases, Nader v. Schaffer and Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee,'02 but neither case supports the

proposition that preserving party labels is a compelling or even an important
state interest when the party does not agree to the regulation. In Nader, the
court applied rational basis and accepted weaker state interests, and the Re-

publican Party, the party endangered by raiding, supported the challenged
statute.1°3 Furthermore, Nader also found that political parties (rather than

states) have an interest in avoiding confusing outcomes in their primaries.'0 4
Nader, therefore, suggests that while states have a legitimate interest in pre-

serving party labels, it is the party that should decide whether the state can
assert this interest in the first place. Eu recognized the state has a legitimate
interest in "fostering an informed electorate," but found that a regulation that
banned a political party's endorsement of a particular primary candidate did

not serve that purpose.' °5 In generally discussing the interest, Eu cited a series of cases that accepted a state interest in preserving party labels where
the regulation at issue prevented party raiding,' limited each voter to a sin-

99. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986) (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 797 (1983)); see also Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 797 (rejecting this state
interest proffered to justify a seven-month filing fee deadline for presidential candidates).
100.

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 221 (quoting Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 798).

101.

Clingman, 544 U.S. at 594 (quoting Nader, 417 F.Supp. at 845).

102. Id. (quoting Nader, 417 E Supp. at 845, and citing Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989)).
103.

Nader,417 E Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976).

104. Id. at 845. Nader cites Ray v.Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 226 n.14 (1952), which found in applying rational basis that a state can reasonably classify voters or candidates according to party
affiliation. But Clingman suggests this rational interest would survive either a stronger rational basis
or intermediate scrutiny because otherwise the classification based on party would not mean anything, and the Court tied that meaning into the associational rights of the other political parties,
noting this could "undermine the crucial role of political parties in the primary process." Clingman,
544 U.S. at 595. This Note argues this language indicates the Court's concern for reverse party
raiding.
105.

Eu, 489 U.S. at 228-29.

106. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (explaining that waiting periods before
voters may change party registration prevented party raiding).
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gle nominating act per office,' ° 7 or ensured a candidate was a serious contender'O All of these cases either implicated voter confusion at the general

election stage-when the associational rights of political parties are much
less important-or prevented party raiding. This state interest would not be

appropriate if used to defend a regulation that a state imposed against a political party's wishes, unless the regulation protected another political party
from party raiding. If the state could burden the party's associational rights

to preserve traditional party ideologies, except if it was protecting another
party's associational rights, it would amount to the state unconstitutionally

substituting its judgment for that of the party.'

9

C. Voters'Right to Form Dual Associations
Voters have associational rights to form dual associations, and at the

very least a dual association raises "significant associational interests.""0

Both the dissent and the concurrence in Clingman suggested that voters had

an interest in associating with more than one party at a time, and the association between an already affiliated voter and the LPO could be

meaningful."' The dissenting and concurring opinions, representing the
views of five Justices, noted that Oklahoma could not prohibit other ways
that the Libertarian Party could form associations with these voters." 2 For

instance, Oklahoma could neither bar donations to more than one party nor
prevent a voter registered with another party from attending a Libertarian
107. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 785-86 (1974) (limiting voters' participation
to one primary or signing a petition supporting an independent candidate).
108. Id. at 779-80 (requiring major political parties nominate candidates in a primary and
minor parties through conventions); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1972) (holding that
states could require candidate filing fees to ensure serious contenders).
109. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 227-28; Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981); see also Clingman, 544 U.S. at 615 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "it is no business of the State to tell a political party what its message should be, how
it should select its candidates, or how it should form coalitions to ensure electoral success" and
listing cases); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986) ("The Party's determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which best allows it to pursue
its political goals, is protected by the Constitution.").
110. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is important to note that a
voter's interest in forming dual associations is fundamentally different than a candidate's interest in
forming an association with more than one political party. In immons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), the Court held that the state can prevent a political party from forming
associations with another party's candidates. While the regulation of candidates implicates the rights
of voters, it does so only tangentially and the state can regulate the general election more heavily.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974).
111.
senting).

See Clingman, 544 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 608 (Stevens, J., dis-

112. See id. at 601 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We surely would not say, for instance, that a
registered Republican or Democrat has no protected interest in associating with the Libertarian
Party by attending meetings or making political contributions. The validity of voters' and parties'
interests in dual associations seems particularly clear where minor parties are concerned. For example, a voter may have a longstanding affiliation with a major party that she wishes to maintain, but
she may nevertheless have a substantial interest in associating with a minor party during particular
election cycles or in elections for particular offices."); id. at 608 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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meeting, as those kinds of regulations would clearly violate the First
Amendment." 3
Despite the Clingman plurality's language that a voter who forms a dual

association forms a minimal association, it is inappropriate for a court to
decide which associations are meaningful. How much or how little association a party wishes to form with a voter is a decision for the party, not a
court.", 4
While voters have an interest in forming associations with more than
one political party, a law that burdens this interest-without more-will
rarely be unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Clingman
suggested that while the voters' interest in forming dual associations was
significant, there may be few instances where a statute preventing dual associations in a primary election would be unconstitutional."' Furthermore,
where the political party opposed such an association, a regulation that burdened the voters' interest in forming a dual association would probably
never alone trigger heightened review.' 6 For example, when a voter sued to
compel a blanket primary in Green v. Texas, the district court held that the
statute mandating a closed primary did not severely burden the voter by pre-

venting him from associating with more than one party in a blanket party,
and that there was an overriding state interest in protecting the political
process and preventing party raiding." 7 Therefore, Texas's lack of a blanket
113. See id. at 608 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No one would contend that a citizen's membership in either the Republican or the Democratic Party could disqualify her from attending political
functions sponsored by another party, or from voting for a third party's candidate in a general election. If a third party invites her to participate in its primary election, her right to support the
candidate of her choice merits constitutional protection, whether she elects to make a speech, to
donate funds, or to cast a ballot."); see also Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 ("Were the State to restrict by
statute financial support of the Party's candidates to Party members, or to provide that only Party
members might be selected as the Party's chosen nominees for public office, such a prohibition of
potential association with nonmembers would clearly infringe upon the rights of the Party's members under the First Amendment to organize with like-minded citizens in support of common
political goals.").
114. See supra notes 64-65, 109 and accompanying text; see also Clingman, 544 U.S. at 602
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I question whether judicial inquiry into the genuineness, intensity, or
duration of a given voter's association with a given party is a fruitful way to approach constitutional
challenges to regulations like the one at issue here. Primary voting is an episodic and sometimes
isolated act of association, but it is a vitally important one and should be entitled to some level of
constitutional protection. Accordingly, where a party invites a voter to participate in its primary and
the voter seeks to do so, we should begin with the premise that there are significant associational
interests at stake. From this starting point, we can then ask to what extent and in what manner the
State may justifiably restrict those interests.").
115. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("But the fact that a State's regulatory authority may ultimately trump voters' or parties' associational interests in a particular context
is no reason to dismiss the validity of those interests.").
116. In essence, voters arguing they had an interest in forming a dual association in a primary
would face a burden on their associational interests even more minor than in Nader, where the burden voters faced was they did not wish to form an association at all. See Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F.
Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
117. Green v. Texas, 351 F. Supp. 143, 145 (N.D. Tex. 1972) ("[T]he Texas statutes here under review serve to protect the political rights of Texans to join political parties and to enjoy the free
right of association appurtenant thereto with some protection against raids and interference from
independents or members of other political parties.").
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primary was constitutional. " ' The political parties in Green v. Texas were
not on record as agreeing to a blanket ballot.' 9 Because the voters stood
alone, they could not compel a blanket primary.
For a burden on the voters' interest in forming dual associations to trigger heightened review, the political party's associational rights must align
with those of the voters. Because the burden identified by the court in Green
was solely on the voters and not on the associational interests of the parties,
the state could assert an interest in the protection of the parties' selfidentified interests."0 Green was essentially like Nader in that the voters had
an associational interest that, alone, was insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. 2' Conversely, when two or more political parties willingly enter
associations with voters who willingly associate with these parties, the state
cannot interfere unless these associations would affect the rights of other
political parties, such as by raising a potential for reverse raiding.
III.

PARTY AND VOTER ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS IN A BLANKET BALLOT:
VOLUNTARY BLANKET PRIMARIES

This Part argues that associational interests of political parties and voters
align when two parties volunteer to issue a blanket primary ballot. So long
as the ballot is only issued to independents and voters registered to the volunteering parties, the constitution compels the state to allow the voluntary
blanket primary. The Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Green Party of
2

Alaska relied heavily on Tashjian and California Democratic Party.' The

opinion only mentioned Clingman once, to note that Clingman's holding
shed some doubt on the earlier jurisprudence and that Clingman was not
controlling because the court found the primary compelled by the Alaska
Constitution. 123 This Part argues that this Note's proposed reading of Clingman relieves the tension between Clingman and California Democratic

Party that caused the Alaska court to leave unanswered the question of
whether voluntary blanket primaries would be compelled by the U.S. Constitution. If Clingman is read for the proposition that the state can protect
other political parties, the U.S. Constitution compels states to allow political
parties to opt-in to participate in a voluntary blanket primary. Yet, states can
118.

Id.

119.

See id. (not mentioning a position taken by the political parties).

120. Id. at 146 ("The State of Texas has an overriding interest, on behalf of its citizenry, in
protecting the integrity of the political process, and such protection certainly includes the prevention
of 'raiding' from one political party to another.").
Compare id. at 145 ("Even if constitutional violations were present, however, we hold as
121.
a matter of law that there exists a compelling state interest for the limitations in question and that
such compelling interest overrides these constitutional considerations.") with Nader, 417 F. Supp. at
845 (not characterizing the magnitude of the burden of the voters associational rights but stating that
"[i]n addition to protecting the associational rights of party members, a state has a more general, but
equally legitimate, interest in protecting the overall integrity of the historic electoral process").
122.

State v. Green Party of Alaska, 118 P.3d 1054 (Alaska 2005).

123.

Id. at 1064 n.72.
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limit the primary to the voters registered with the participating parties and
independents.
Section III.A contends that because the associational interests of voters
and political parties align in this regime-in a way that affects no other political party-strict scrutiny applies to a ban on a voluntary blanket primary.
A ban on voluntary blanket primary ballots would at least significantly, and
possibly severely, burden both the right of voters to associate with more than
one political party and the right of political parties to broaden their voter
base. Section III.B discusses the possible interests that a state could assert to
prevent two parties from issuing a voluntary blanket primary. No state interest emerges that is sufficient to outweigh the associational rights involved,
either because the interests are not important or compelling, or because the
state can tailor the primary regime in another way that does not burden the
associational rights of voters or parties.
A. Preventing Voluntary Blanket PrimariesSignificantly Burdens
the Rights of Partiesand Voters
A court must apply a heightened review, if not strict scrutiny, to a law
preventing a voluntary blanket primary because such a law would significantly or severely burden political parties' and voters' associational rights.
While it is difficult to quantify exactly how much of a burden would compel
strict scrutiny, the burdens in this case are quite similar to those at issue in
California Democratic Party. California Democratic Party held that compelling political parties to issue a blanket primary against their preferences
severely burdens those parties' associational rights.14 The reverse, forbidding parties to issue a blanket primary against their preferences, is equally
true. 25 For a state to prevent such an association when the parties opt-in to a
voluntary blanket primary is just as burdensome on the parties' associational
rights. Just as the state cannotforce parties to associate in this way, the state
cannot prevent parties from associating in this way when they choose to do
so.
There are many reasons a party may want to hold a blanket primary with
other parties. Where a party wishes to attract centrist voters who might vote
for its candidates even if they are registered with another party, that party
may favor a blanket primary. For example, Alaska instituted a blanket ballot
in 1947. At that time, Alaska Republicans "supported the blanket primary in
hopes that Republican candidates would benefit by attracting conservative
Democrats and non-aligned voters."'' 2 6 Some Democrats also supported the
blanket primary and argued in favor of blanket primaries because "[i]n [a

124.

Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).

125. California DemocraticParty relied on the idea that the "corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate." Id. at 574.
126. O'Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Memorandum from
Gordon S. Harrison, Director, Legislative Research Agency, Research Request 90.294 (May 23,
1990)).
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particular district in Alaska],
' probably nine of every ten voters want to vote

for the man, not the party." 127

Any regime that denies the ability of voters to affiliate with parties in a
voluntary blanket primary burdens their associational interests. When parties
attempt to issue a voluntary blanket primary ballot, the associational interests of the voters and the political parties align as they did in Tashjian. A
burden on these aligned associational interests should trigger at least intermediate scrutiny if not strict scrutiny. Because the political party has the
discretion to opt-in to the blanket primary, no other party is adversely affected by the association. 9 As Justice Marshall argued in Tashjian,
nonmembers have a right to associate with a political party. 13 If a state prevented nonmembers from contributing to or becoming candidates for a
political party, it "would clearly infringe upon the rights of the Party's
members under the First Amendment to organize with like-minded citizens
in support of common political goals."''
At the very least, a prohibition on a voluntary blanket primary should
trigger intermediate scrutiny, if not strict scrutiny, because it burdens the
political parties' right to broaden their associations and the voters' right to
associate with more than one party. While the Court has never explicitly
accepted the right to associate simultaneously with multiple political parties,
five Justices in Clingman acknowledged that such a right must exist. As
these Justices argued in the concurrence and dissent in Clingman, prohibiting a voter from donating to more than one political party at one time would
clearly violate the voter's associational rights." Preventing a voluntary
blanket primary, similarly, would burden this interest. Justice O'Connor
doubted a burden on this right by itself would ever cause a court to nullify a
law. Nevertheless, where both the political party and the voters wish to affiliate with each other, any reviewing court should start from Justice
O'Connor's presumption that "there are significant associational interests at
stake."'33 As the next Section argues, whether the heightened level of review
is intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, the state does not have important
or compelling interests to justify a ban on a voluntary blanket primary.
127. Id. at 1256. Similarly, when voters in California imposed a partisan blanket primary
through Proposition 198 in 1996, the statement of support on the ballot pamphlet contended it
would allow voters to vote "for the best candidate for each office, regardless of party affiliation."
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
128.

See supra Section B.A.

129. Of course, the voluntary blanket primary could only be issued to independent voters and
voters registered with opting-in parties to avoid the problem in Clingman. If the ballots were issued
to voters who were registered to a party that did not opt-in, that party would be threatened by the
same disorganizing effects or election disorder. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005);
see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 n.13 (1986).
130. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215.
131.

Id.

132.

See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.

133. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208
(1986); Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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B. No Important or Compelling State Interest Prevents
a Voluntary Blanket Primary

No state interest is capable of overriding the associational rights implicated when parties wish to issue a voluntary blanket primary. In defending a
ban on blanket primaries, the state might assert a generalized interest in
(1) preventing party raiding; 4 (2) protecting the integrity of elections,
which could translate more generally to protecting the political parties; 135 or
(3) "avoid[ing] primary election outcomes which would tend to confuse or
mislead the general voting population. ' 36 None of these potential interests is
sufficiently important or compelling when the political parties do not assent
to the regulation.
A shared primary ballot does not implicate the state's interest in preventing party raiding or reverse primary raiding. Presumably, none of the parties
on the ballot is concerned by raiding, since they all chose to be on the ballot." 7 The voluntary blanket primary also does not allow reverse party
raiding as long as only the voters registered to the volunteering parties and
independents can choose the blanket ballot. Even if the dicta in Clingman
allows the state to assert an interest in preventing confusion among the voting population by maintaining party ideologies, 11 the interest is not
compelling. "'

The state cannot constitutionally prevent a voluntary blanket primary by
asserting an interest in protecting the associational rights of the parties because that would amount to substituting the state's judgment for that of the
parties."40 The state interest in protecting the integrity of the election often
justifies limiting the voter to a single nominating act,14 or preventing a voter
from opening a primary without the affected political party's acquiescence.142 While both Clingman and American Party of Texas suggest that the
state may choose to limit the voter to one party's primary, neither case involved a situation in which both parties agreed to permit the voters to form
134. E.g., Clingman, 544 U.S. at 596.
135. See, e.g., id.; see also Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 286 (noting there is a diffuse state
interest in protecting the integrity of elections); supra Section II.B
(discussing instances where the
state has asserted an interest in protecting the associational rights of political parties).
136. E.g., Clingman, 544 U.S. at 594 (quoting Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D.
Conn. 1976)).
137. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 219 & n.9 (finding the interest is not implicated when the political party chooses to allow those voters into its primary).
138.

See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.

139.

Compare Clingman, 544 U.S. at 593-94, with Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220.
140. See Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981);
see also Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc)
("[A] party's choice, as among various ways of governing itself, of the one which seems best calculated to strengthen the party and advance its interests, deserves the protection of the Constitution
141.

Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 785 (1974).

142.

See, e.g., Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 849-50 (D. Conn. 1976).
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dual associations with the other political parties. 4 1 If the state were to impose this limitation on voters and parties who wanted to participate in a
voluntary blanket primary, however, it could only defend its regulation by
asserting interests in protecting the parties from themselves or substituting
the state's judgment for the judgment of the parties, and neither interest
would pass muster.'4
The Alaskan Democratic Party's choice to join or partially join the blanket ballot amounts to an internal party decision, and neither a state nor a
court may prevent the party from making its own decision. 4 1 In 2004, the
Green and Republican Moderate Parties in Alaska won a preliminary injunction, which allowed any political party to choose to join the blanket primary
for the 2004 election. 146 Each of the four recognized minor parties in Alaska
joined the blanket ballot. 147 The Democratic Party, however, balked. Possibly
because of its fears of party raiding, the Democratic Party refused to participate in a primary in which registered Republicans could vote.148 As a result,
Alaska issued three ballots: (1) the Republican ballot, which only registered
Republicans and unaffiliated voters could choose; (2) the "Democratic plus"
ballot, that any voter who was not a registered Republican could choose and
which listed all candidates except the Republican slate; and (3) the blanket
ballot, which any voter, including a registered Republican, could choose,
and which listed candidates of all the minor political parties. ' After the
final decision in Green Party of Alaska, holding voluntary blanket primaries
compelled by the Alaska Constitution, the Democratic Party decided to allow Republicans to vote in its primary. 5 ° Therefore, in the 2006 August
primary, there were two ballots on which a voter could nominate candidates:
(1) a Republican ballot that a registered Republican or an unaffiliated voter
could choose; and (2) a blanket ballot which anyone could choose, listing
each party's slate except for the Republican one.' 5' In choosing to join the
143.

See supranotes 88, 90 and accompanying text.

144.

See supra Section I.B; see also supra notes 64-65, 109 and accompanying text.

145.

See supranotes 64-65, 109 and accompanying text.

146. See Andrew Petty, Alaska court decision approves joint primaries: Republican Party
says it will have a separateprimary in 2006--as before, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Aug. 16, 2005, available
at http://alaskalegislature.com/stories/081605/primaries.shtml.
147. Id. These four parties were the Green Party, the Republican Moderate Party, the Libertarian Party, and the Alaska Independent Party. Id.
148.

Id.

149.

Id.

150. Shortly after the final decision in Green Party of Alaska, the Democratic Party announced that it would place its candidates on the 2006 blanket primary ballot, and also allow
registered Republicans to vote in its primary. Therefore, there was no 2006 "Democratic plus" ballot; the democratic ticket will go on the blanket primary ballot which any registered voter may
choose. Petty, supranote 146.
Choices, http://
Election-Ballot
151. See State of Alaska, 2006 Primary
www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/forms/x01_06.pdf (noting two ballot types that included candidates: 1) Combined with Ballot Measures, listing the parties on that ballot as Alaska Democratic
Party, Alaska Libertarian Party, Alaska Independence Party, and Green Party of Alaska; and 2) Republican with Ballot Measures).
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blanket primary partially in 2004, and fully in 2006, the Democratic Party
exercised its judgment. The Democrats knew the primary had a potential for
raiding because of what happened in the 1980 senatorial primary,5 2 and yet
they seem to have decided this risk was outweighed by the primary's potential for broadening the appeal of Democratic candidates. The state cannot
interfere in 5this
type of decision, even if it verges on the Democrats' self3
destruction.

Even if the state has an important or compelling interest in preserving
party labels and avoiding outcomes that would tend to confuse voters, regu-

lating who votes in political primaries is not narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. Regulating which candidates can stand for election better addresses
the preservation of party labels."'" For instance, states can require candidates
to have a lasting affiliation with the party, such as by requiring an oath of
loyalty."' Alternatively, states can allow parties to restrict the candidates
51 6

who appear on their primary ballot to those who fit with their ideology.
The state can also mandate that the candidate not vote in another party's
primary"' or run on another party's ticket for a period of years."' A state can
choose to use any of these measures to ensure'59party candidates support the

central tenets of the party to avoid confusion. These regulations are more
narrowly tailored to the state interest than a prohibition on voluntary blanket
primaries. If states regulate the primary in alternative ways that would preserve party labels, both the voters and the parties would still exercise their

associational rights via a voluntary blanket primary.
152.

See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.

153. See supra notes 64-65, 109 and accompanying text; see also Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1989) ("[E]ven if [a state regulation] saves a political
party from pursuing self-destructive acts, that would not justify a State substituting its judgment for
that of the party.").
154. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) ("Regulations imposing
severe burdens on [parties'] rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest." (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)) (alteration in
original)).
155.

See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).

156. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11 th Cir. 1996) (upholding a state law that permitted the
Republican Party to exclude plaintiff from its presidential primary ballot); see also Democratic
Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (considering whether political parties have the right to define their association and limit it to those people only). Of course, no
such scheme could pass muster if it became a defacto appointment process and allowed the political
party leadership to circumvent their moment of accountability. See, e.g., Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State
Bd. of Elections, No. 06-0635-cv, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22310, at * 100 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2006).
157. See Lippit v. Cipollone, 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1032
(1972); see also McClure v. Galvin, 386 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2004) (requiring independent candidates
not to have registered with a party or voted in a primary for 90 days prior to the filing date was
constitutional); cf Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (accepting that states may impose burdens to determine whether a candidate is "serious").
158.

See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).

159. See Duke, 87 F.3d at 1235 (considering the state has a compelling interest in protecting
political parties' right to define their membership and finding Georgia's statute, which allows three
party leaders to decide which candidates in a presidential primary are aligned with the parties views
and to exclude others, narrowly tailored to fit that interest).
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Moreover, the state can narrow the scope of the voluntary blanket primary to protect the associational interests of the party that chooses not to
join the voluntary blanket primary. For example, under this Note's reading
of Clingman, the state could mandate a "semi-closed" voluntary blanket
primary in order to prevent reverse party raiding. In such a primary, the
blanket ballot would not be available to voters registered to a party that did
not join the voluntary blanket primary. In Alaska, for instance, the state
could choose to prevent registered Republicans from voting in the blanket
primary. By preventing registered Republicans from voting in the voluntary
blanket primary, the state would minimize the risk that the registered Republican would remain registered to the Republican Party but have a different
party loyalty. The Republican Party did not opt-in to the voluntary blanket
primary and it chose only to allow independents, unaffiliated voters, and
registered Republicans to vote in its primary.' 6° Any state action that would
protect the Republican Party of Alaska from voters registered to other parties, therefore, would be permissible because it would protect that party's
internal decision.
CONCLUSION

The holdings in Clingman and CaliforniaDemocratic Party demonstrate
the uneasy tension between state regulation of primaries and party associational rights. Any primary system requires a political party to associate with
voters who may or may not have the party's best interests at heart. Thus, in
any primary, there will always be a potential for raiding, but that potential is
not implicated where the party agrees to allow the voters to vote in its primary. When a party chooses to allow associations with voters who may or
may not be hostile to its interests, it is an internal party decision and the
state may not prohibit it unless it is protecting the associational rights of
another political party. When more than one political party willingly
chooses to associate with a voter who in turn chooses to associate with those
willing parties, the state has no business limiting the number of parties with
which a voter associates. It can only limit the voter to one nomination per
office. This Note has argued that if the state prevents a voluntary blanket
primary by asserting the interests of the party which chooses to join such a
primary, it would be tantamount to regulating a party's internal processes in
breach of the party's fundamental rights. For that reason, neither a court nor
a state may prevent a party from entering into a voluntary blanket primary.

160. Petty, supra note 146; see also State of Alaska, 2006 Primary Election-Ballot Choices,
supra note 151.
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